Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow Policies Designed To Discourage Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups? by Powell, Lisa
Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow




The word "eugenics" invokes disturbing images of Nazi euthanasia and
Chinese forced sterilization programs. Although many Americans probably as-
sume that eugenic practices would not be allowed within the United States,
eugenics has a long history in American policy, and variants of eugenic polices
are a significant, ongoing feature of our political landscape. Current equal pro-
tection jurisprudence neither acknowledges nor accounts for this phenomenon,
and explicitly eugenic laws are arguably constitutional under the Supreme
Court's current jurisprudence. Eugenic policies are inherently subordinating, as
they place lower values on the lives of those targeted. Nevertheless, the consti-
tutional principle addressing equality, the Equal Protection Clause,' offers very
limited protection against eugenic policies, because current jurisprudence fo-
cuses on non-differentiation by race, sex, and other protected classifications.
This Note illustrates the danger of equal protection jurisprudence that ig-
nores subordination. Scholars have argued for an anti-subordination framework
for equal protection, identifying seemingly subordinating practices that were
upheld under equal protection challenges and showing how an anti-
2subordination norm would lead to better results in these cases. This Note goes
a step further, analyzing eugenic policies, which have not been challenged re-
cently, but seem to be consistent with the current understanding of equal pro-
tection even though they are clearly subordinating. The case that the current
understanding of equal protection is inadequate is reinforced by examining
historical and current eugenic policies, which are largely outside the scope of
equal protection despite their long and continuing history of use to subordinate
unpopular groups. A reformulation of equal protection that protects against
subordination of any disadvantaged group rather than merely protecting against
differentiation along racial and certain other lines would rectify this problem.
t J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 2003.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Standards of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997).
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This Note is organized in three parts. Part I reviews the interconnections
between eugenics and the subordination of racial minorities and other socially
disadvantaged groups in the context of the eugenics movement of the early
twentieth century in the United States. Part II demonstrates that discussing
eugenic laws is not merely an academic exercise, as eugenic laws attempting to
discourage childbirth among certain socially unpopular groups implicitly re-
main a significant part of the American policy landscape. This Part examines
policies such as welfare "family caps" and prosecutions of women who use co-
caine while pregnant. Part III discusses the constitutionality of eugenic laws,
arguing that despite eugenics dark past, many eugenic laws may be constitu-
tional under the Court's current jurisprudence. Although some of the more co-
ercive laws might be invalidated as violations of the substantive due process
right to privacy, the Equal Protection Clause offers only minimal protection.
However, these laws would be clearly unconstitutional under a more appropri-
ate framework for equal protection, adopting a norm of anti-subordination
rather than of anti-differentiation.
I. THE EUGENICS MOVEMENT AND
SUBORDINATION OF POWERLESS GROUPS
A. Introduction
Eugenics arose out of burgeoning understanding of genetics in the late
nineteenth century. A common definition of eugenics is the "study of human
improvement by genetic means.",3 However, the "study" has often been only
superficially academic, and "genetic means" have often been conflated with
concepts of socio-cultural heritability.4 Thus, I use "eugenic" policies to refer
to any method of attempting to improve humanity or a specific society in the
future by changing the future composition of that society. Such efforts include
attempting to alter birth patterns by sterilization or other methods to discourage
reproduction among those people deemed unfit to reproduce. 5 Although this
paper focuses on attempts to discourage births among certain groups, attempts
to encourage "fit" people to reproduce6 or to alter survival patterns, for exam-
3. Eugenics and Human Genetics, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1N BIOETHICS 511, 511 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & LeRoy Waiters eds., 5th ed. 1999).
4. See, e.g., A Eugenics Program: American Eugenics Society Considers Measures to Correct the
Adverse Differential Birthrate, 27 J. HEREDITY 195, 195 (1936) (stating that "Eugenics must take into
consideration the human environment as well as human genetics") [hereinafter Adverse Differential
Birthrate].
5. See, e.g., Adverse Differential Birthrate, supra note 4, at 196-97 (discussing various methods of





pie through euthanasia programs, are included in the definition above.7
Eugenicists believed that most social problems were caused by hereditary
faults of those afflicted by the problem, and they sought to eventually eliminate
these problems from society through selective breeding. The eugenics move-
ment quickly gained popularity and was widely supported by physicians, scien-
tific eugenicists, and lawyers. 8 At one point, basic eugenic teachings were so
widely accepted that they were commonly incorporated into high school curric-
ula.9 Some supporters pushed eugenic teachings with religious fervor. For ex-
ample, eugenicists stressed the "urgent need for a Messiah of the human germ
plasm" to save civilization from otherwise inevitable decline.'
0
States began attempting to stem reproduction among the "unfit" by segre-
gating them into asylums or prisons or enacted laws forbidding certain catego-
ries of people to marry,1 ' but the policy focus quickly shifted toward steriliza-
tion, which proved less expensive and more effective. 12 In 1899, the vasectomy
was developed for eugenic purposes, suggested for "inebriates, imbeciles, per-
verts and paupers,"' 13 and later perfected on forty-two inmates of the Indiana
Reformatory. 14 By the 1930s, more than thirty states had passed involuntary
eugenic sterilization laws,' 5 typically applied to the insane, "idiots and imbe-
ciles," and criminals. 16 Although seven state laws were invalidated as uncon-
7. See, e.g., NANCY LEYS STEPAN, THE HOUR OF EUGENICS: RACE, GENDER, AND NATION IN
LATIN AMERICA 29 (1991) (quoting a eugenicist as saying "the lethal chamber, segregation and sterili-
zation" were the only ways to "diminish the dangerous fertility of the unfit"); Jonathan Glover, Ques-
tions about Some Uses of Genetic Engineering, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS, supra note 3,
at 586-87 (discussing eugenics in terms of altering breeding patterns or patterns of survival).
8. Philip R. Reilly, Eugenic Sterilization in the United States, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 516, 518.
9. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Trials and Cases of the 20th Century in America, 27 LITIG. 8, 11 (dis-
cussing the Scopes trial of a teacher fired for teaching evolution in Tennessee). The book the teacher
used, Civic Biology, contained the following passage: "If such people [the "unfit"] were lower animals,
we would probably kill them off to prevent them from spreading. Humanity will not allow this, but we
do have [methods of preventing reproduction]." Id.
10. Adverse Differential Birthrate, supra note 4, at 200-01. See also Julian S. Huxley, Eugenics
and Society, 28 EUGENICS REV. 11, 30-31 (1936).
11. See, e.g., DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY, 99-100 (1985); Matthew J. Lindsay, Reproducing a Fit Citizenry: Dependency, Eugenics,
and the Law of Marriage in the United States, 1860-1920, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 541 (1998). Of
course, "fornication" outside of marriage was already illegal.
12. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 92-94.
13. Id. at 518.
14. Id.
15. See Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS,
supra note 3, at 528-29.
16. See Reilly, supra note 8, at 518-19. A widely-circulated "model" sterilization law suggested
sterilization of all "socially inadequate classes," which included the "feeble-minded," insane, crimi-
nalistic, drug addicts, those with chronic, infectious diseases, the blind, the deaf, the "deformed," and
the "dependent," which included "orphans, ne'er-do-wells, the homeless, tramps, and paupers." Harry
Laughlin, Model Eugenical Sterilization Law, in EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, A
REPORT OF THE PSYCHOPATHIC LABORATORY OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF CHICAGO 445, 447 (1922).
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stitutional in state or lower federal courts, 17 the Supreme Court upheld Vir-
ginia's eugenic sterilization law in Buck v. Bell in 1927,18 a decision that has
never been overturned. Between 1900 and 1963, at least 60,000 Americans
were sterilized pursuant to eugenic sterilization laws.' 9 In response to a lawsuit,
in 1974 the federal government adopted regulations banning sterilization with-
out consent in hospitals that receive federal funds, 20 but reports of violations
surface periodically.
21
B. Eugenics as Subordination
This Part examines the use of eugenic policies to subordinate unpopular
groups, especially racial minorities. Examining the connections between
eugenic policies and subordination is important to understanding why equal
protection jurisprudence that ignores subordination inadequately protects pow-
erless groups. Additionally, the discussion of subordination highlights some of
the parallels between the historic eugenics movement and current implicitly
eugenic policies.
With the goal of eliminating or reducing the population of certain groups in
the future, eugenics definitionally subordinates the groups regulated. The ad-
jective "subordinate" is defined as "1. Placed in or belonging to a lower rank,
class, or position. 2. Subject to another's authority or control."22 The central
premise of eugenics corresponds to the first definition of subordination-the
idea that some groups are so much less valuable than others that the world
would be better off if their numbers were reduced or eliminated. The second
definition, submission to authority, supplies the foundation for government
eugenic policy. Eugenic policies are premised on the theory that the state may
justifiably coerce or compel these "inferior" groups to limit or forgo reproduc-
23tion, the most basic human instinct. Thus, eugenic policy embodies both of
17. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L.
REv. 1418, 1434 (1981); Reilly, supra note 8, at 519.
18. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See infra text accompanying notes 160-161.
19. Reilly, supra note 8, at 521.
20. See Reif v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). See also DOROTHY ROBERTS,
KILLING THE BLACK BODY 93 (1997).
21. See, e.g., KEVLES, supra note 11, at 275-76. Abuse may still be fairly widespread. See
ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 89-95.
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1439 (7th ed. 1999).
23. Some eugenic activists argued for "positive eugenics" to encourage childbirth among the most
"fit," through measures such as larger tax deductions for larger families and provision of part-day nurs-
ery schools to give harried mothers a rest. See, e.g., Adverse Differential Birthrate, supra note 4, at
196-97; Frederick Osbom & Carl Jay Bajema, The Eugenic Hypothesis, 19 SOC. BIOL. 337 (1972);
KEVLES, supra note 11, at 85. Although such "positive eugenics" contains subordinating aspects of dif-
ferentially valuing lives, the issue of whether "positive eugenics" is subordinating is somewhat more
complex. Because "negative eugenics" is clearly subordinating and has always been a more prominent
strand of American eugenic policy, I focus on negative eugenics here. It is worth noting that at the
height of the eugenics movement, eugenics was used to promote a wide variety of causes, including
sexual liberty, birth control, feminism, and socialism. See, e.g., KEVLES, supra note 11, at 86-90.
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the ideas central to subordination-inferiority, and submission.
Additionally, the United States's eugenic policies often have been subordi-
nating in the sense that they have been used to harm unpopular groups and to
reinforce the existing social hierarchy. The rhetoric promoting eugenics was
steeped in derogatory and paranoid images of the "unfit."24 Members of a vari-
ety of groups, including racial minorities, the poor, criminals, people with
mental illnesses, or virtually any socially unpopular group, were deemed ge-
netically defective and doomed to reproduce their circumstances in their chil-
dren. A prominent eugenicist even opined that prostitutes were motivated by
"innate eroticism" rather than economic or social circumstances. 25 Government
action was necessary to control these "anti-social propagators of unnecessary
,26 27human beings'  so they would not destroy society by their prolific breeding.
Some eugenicists completely devalued the lives of those deemed unfit: "It is the
acme of stupidity ... to talk in such cases of individual liberty.... Such indi-
viduals have no rights. They have no right in the first instance to be born, but
having been born, they have no right to propagate their kind.,
28
Eugenics provided a convenient rationale to oppose or dismantle social
protections for disadvantaged groups. Social protections such as the minimum
wage, the eight-hour work day, and public medical services were said to lead to
increases in "unemployables, degenerates, and physical and mental weaklings"
by encouraging people to irresponsibly have children that they could not sup-
port. As a result, certain social programs, such as the traditional welfare pro-
gram Aid to Dependent Children, later Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, were deliberately designed to give states the flexibility to deny benefits to
those deemed unworthy, in part for fear of supporting their "irresponsible" re-
29production. For example, many states' welfare programs excluded African
Americans and some excluded women having "improper" relationships with a
30man.
The net of eugenic programs was cast widely to encompass a great variety
of socially disfavored groups and selectively applied, especially to racial mi-
nority groups and the poor.31 For example, the tests used to detect people
24. See generally Francis Galton, Hereditary Talent and Character, 12 MACMILLAN'S MAG. 157-
66, 318-27 (1865), reprinted in EUGENICS THEN AND Now 14, 31 (Carl J. Bajema ed., 1976); Adverse
Differential Birthrate, supra note 4.
25. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 53.
26. Id. at 34 (citing KARL PEARSON, THE ETHIC OF FREETHOUGHT 61 (1901)).
27. See, e.g., Adverse Differential Birthrate, supra note 4; Reilly, supra note 8, at 516-18.
28. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 93-94.
29. See, e.g., JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON
POVERTY (1994).
30. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating Alabama's rule, designed to dis-
courage immorality and illegitimacy, denying benefits for any mother who visits frequently with a man
"for the purpose of cohabiting."); QUADAGNO, supra note 29, at 119-20.
31. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 168.
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thought to have heritable "feeblemindedness" were highly flawed, enormously
overly inclusive, and biased against those with little formal education. 32 Some
states seemed to care little whether a "feebleminded" person singled out for
sterilization was mentally retarded or merely poorly educated. For example, all
of the famous "three generations of imbeciles" of Buck v. Bell3 3 were of normal
intelligence, 34 but they were persecuted as part of the "shiftless, ignorant, and
worthless class of anti-social whites of the South ' 35 who had children out of
wedlock. 36 Sterilization for "sexual license" was widespread, as was an explicit
ground for sterilization in many states.37 Virginia implemented eugenic sterili-
zation in a particularly hostile manner, raiding rural communities and sterilizing
whole families, such that "everybody who was- drawing welfare then was
scared they were going to have it done on them.
38
C. Eugenics and Racism
From the start of the eugenics movement in the United States, eugenics and
racism were intertwined and mutually reinforcing. The eugenics movement was
"fed, nurtured, and sustained by racism."39 Because the United States had used
notions of biologically inherited inferiority to justify hundreds of years of slav-
ery, racism provided a framework for the development and acceptance of
eugenic thought.4° Sir Francis Galton, widely considered the father of eugenics,
was openly racist, describing all races other than "Anglo-Saxon" as "lower
races," "brutes," and "savages. '41 Galton described the purpose of eugenics as
giving "the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing
speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had.
42
32. For example, the Army administered such tests to draftees in World War I and found that 47%
of the white draftees and 89% of the black draftees had a mental age of twelve or less, suggesting that
many of those defending the United States were subject to sterilization under the laws of their states.
See Cynkar, supra note 17, at 1424.
33. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). See infra text accompanying notes 160-161.
34. Gould, supra note 15. The youngest, Vivian Buck, was deemed feebleminded at seven months
old based on a social worker's assessment that "there is a look about it that is not quite normal." (Note
the de-personalizing use of the word "it.") Id. at 531. Despite such low expectations, Vivian Buck at-
tended school, received normal grades, and even made the honor roll before dying at age eight. Id. at
531-32.
35. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 110 (quoting a deposition for Buck v. Bell of Harry Laughlin, of the
Eugenics Record Office, regarding the Buck family).
36. Gould, supra note 15, at 531. Carrie Buck's pregnancy was probably the result of rape. She
was institutionalized for newly discovered feeblemindedness to hide her shame from her community. Id.
at 53 1; Nicole Huberfeld, Recent Development: Three Generations of Welfare Mothers Are Enough: A
Disturbing Return to Eugenics in the Recent "Workfare" Law, 9 UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 98, 119 (1998).
37. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 68.
38. Id. at 116 (quoting Howard Hale, a former member of the Montgomery County, Virginia,
Board of Supervisors). See also ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 61.
39. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 81.
40. ld. at 70.
41. Galton, supra note 24, at 31.
42. EUGENICS THEN AND Now 14 (Carl J. Bajema ed., 1976) (quoting FRANCIS GALTON,
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Throughout eugenic literature, notions of protecting the white race and the hu-
man race were often conflated and indistinguishable,43 such that eugenics took
on racist overtones even in writings that were not explicitly racialized.4 In
1935, American geneticist Hermann Muller wrote that eugenics had become
"hopelessly perverted" into a pseudoscientific facade for "advocates of race
and class prejudice., 45 He was correct, except that eugenics had not become
perverted; it was a pseudoscientific instrument of race and class subordination
from its very inception.
Racism encouraged the progression from developing eugenic theories to
implementing eugenic social programs. For example, California enacted its
sterilization law in part in reaction to the influx of "racially inferior" Chinese
46and Mexicans. Xenophobia provided the major impetus for the resurgence of
the American eugenics movement after World War I.4 7 Although the first
eugenic literature emerged in Europe, the United States soon became the world
leader in racist eugenics. An early Nazi advocate of "racial hygiene" criticized
Germany for having a limited and slow-moving eugenics program compared to
48the United States. In turn, the American Eugenics Society publicly endorsed
the first Nazi sterilization law passed in 1933,49 which was modeled after Cali-
fornia's eugenic sterilization law.50 As with many American eugenic laws, the
first Nazi eugenic law did not explicitly target "inferior" races, but both Nazi
and American eugenic policy were built upon and intertwined with racism.
51
America's legacy of racism also influenced the contours of American
eugenic policy. For example, the United States may have been willing to un-
dertake the extreme policy of forced sterilization because it had stronger prece-
dent for controlling the reproduction of the "biologically inferior" than Euro-
pean nations. It was a small step to sterilizing the unfit from the legal practice
of castrating black males for committing certain crimes and from the wholesale
control of black fertility under slavery.52 An American developed the vasec-
tomy for eugenic purposes, and Indiana adopted the first eugenic sterilization
INQUiRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND IT DEVELOPMENT (1883). Galton coined the term "eugenics" in
the same book.).
43. The notion of race was even more confounded than this, as eugenicists also referred variously
to the White, Anglo-Saxon, and Nordic races. See, e.g., Galton, supra note 24, at 326; MADISON
GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE (1923).
44. See, e.g., MARGARET SANGER, PIVOT OF CIVILIZATION 175, 189 (1922); Adverse Differential
Birthrate, supra note 4.
45. See KEvLES, supra note 11, at 164.
46. Reilly, supra note 8, at 518.
47. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 72; Reilly, supra note 8, at 520.
48. Robert Jay Lifton, Sterilization and the Nazi Biomedical Vision, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 533.
49. See KEVLES, supra note 11.
50. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 68.
51. Seeld. at 81.
52. Id. at 61, 66.
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law in the world, twenty-six years before the first Nazi sterilization law.53 In
contrast, Great Britain had an active eugenics movement that was much less
racialized, and Great Britain never adopted sterilization policies.
54
Furthermore, racism may have affected the implementation of facially race-
neutral eugenic laws, which were applied disproportionately to minority
groups. For example, almost two-thirds of women sterilized in North Carolina
in the 1930s and 1940s were black.55 Similarly, in Virginia, the overwhelming
majority of those sterilized were poor, and approximately half of them were
black.56 Eugenic laws targeted the poor, exempting those wealthy enough to
obtain private treatment for mental illness or retardation and those who com-
mitted "white collar" rather the common crimes.57 Targeting the poor, com-
bined with the pervasive socio-economic oppression of black people, would
have a racially disparate impact even absent any explicit racial targeting. Simi-
larly, sterilizing criminals would have had a disproportionate impact on African
Americans even absent racial targeting of the eugenics laws, due to the biased
criminal prosecution of African Americans. 58 However, considering the promi-
nence of racial rhetoric in the eugenics movement, it seems unlikely that there
was no intentional racial targeting in addition to the disparate impact.
Finally, even after eugenics fell into general disrepute, eugenic sterilization
continued in areas with a high concentration of racial minorities. For example,
in 1948, over forty percent of the eugenic sterilizations performed in the United
States and its territories were performed in Puerto Rico.59 If U.S. territories are
excluded, southern states were responsible for the majority of sterilizations af-
ter World War II. In 1952, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia sterilized
fifty-three percent of the people sterilized in the United States. By 1958, these
three states accounted for over three-fourths of the people sterilized nation-
ally.
6 °
II. EUGENICS IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING: CURRENT PRACTICES
It may seem like an academic exercise to discuss the eugenics movement in
the United States, as one can read from any number of sources that eugenics
53. Indiana adopted the first sterilization law in 1907. Reilly, supra note 8, at 518. The Nazis
passed their first sterilization law in 1933. Lifton, supra note 48, at 534.
54. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 76, 94.
55. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 90.
56. KEVLES, supra note 11, at 168.
57. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942) (noting that Oklahoma's eugenic
sterilization law exempted those convicted of embezzlement, political offenses, or violating revenue
laws).
58. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1955 (1993).
59. Lee R. Dice, Heredity Clinics: Their Value for Public Service and Research, 4 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 1, 1 (1952).
60. Reilly, supra note 8, at 523. Reilly's numbers do not explicitly exclude Puerto Rico, but logi-
cally they must. I have not found any data on sterilizations in Puerto Rico after 1948.
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has been discredited as "bad science" and is no longer with us.61 However, this
Part explores current, implicitly eugenic policies, underscoring the importance
of examining equal protection in light of eugenics and the ongoing need to
adopt jurisprudence that focuses on subordination.
It is true that today no reputable scientist would openly advance eugenic
theories62 and most politicians are too savvy say the word "eugenics." Ameri-
can values have undergone significant change over the past century, but the
transformation may be as much one of language as it is a transformation of at-. 63
titudes and practices. Although eugenic sterilization may have largely disap-
peared in the United States, 64 eugenics, like racism, remains as a prominent
strand in political rhetoric and an influence in American social policy. Much as
speakers use coded language to evoke racial sympathies today, eugenics is dis-
cussed with coded words. Policy makers today invoke similar imagery and use
similar reasoning for efforts to discourage reproduction among certain groups,
but they never call it eugenics and rarely admit that race is a factor. Instead,
conservative activists refer mysteriously to "unobserved parental characteris-
tics" rather than genetic faults contributing to poverty, and they promote con-
cepts such as fighting a "culture of poverty' 65 through fertility control. In this
Part, I argue that two specific policies, measures discouraging welfare recipi-
ents from having children and the prosecution of women who use cocaine
while pregnant, are extensions of the earlier eugenics movement. Finally, I pro-
vide a very brief overview of other American social policies that may have
been influenced by eugenic concerns.
61. See, e.g., JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY: GENES, RACE, AND HISTORY 89-95, 150-
51 (1995) (discussing the failure of eugenics).
62. However, some popular social scientists continue to advance eugenic theories. See, e.g.,
RICHARD J. HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICA (1994); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY
1950-1980 (1984). Interestingly, even Murray carefully avoids the word "eugenic(s)." The word does
not appear in the index of Losing Ground, and the word does not appear at all in the text of two articles
by him posted on a pro-eugenics website. See Charles Murray, IQ Will Put You in Your Place, at
http://www.eugenics.net/papers/murray.html (May 25, 1997); Charles Murray & Daniel Seligman,
More on the Bell Curve, at http://www.eugenics.net/papers/mssel.html (Dec. 8, 1997). But compare
HERNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra at 364, using the term "dysgenic," the opposite of eugenic, to describe
current birth patterns.
63. See Reva B. Siegel, "'The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117, 2177-84 (1996), for a discussion of "preservation-through-transformation," the manner in
which the language and structure practices with which the legal system enforces social stratification
evolve over time as those practices are contested and become viewed as unacceptable.
64. Although they are now quite restricted by federal regulations, approximately twenty states still
have involuntary eugenic sterilization laws on the books. See KEVLES, supra note 11, at 111 (stating
that twenty-two states still have eugenic sterilization laws); Reilly, supra note 8, at 523 (putting the
number at nineteen). See also In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793 (N.C. 1983) (upholding the denial of a
petition by the state to sterilize a retarded woman, but setting forth standards by which sterilizations
could be authorized).
65. See, e.g., SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN'S
LIFE CHANCES, 149-56 (1997); MURRAY, supra note 62, at 202-36.
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A. Of Welfare Queens and Family Caps
As discussed above, eugenics encompasses efforts to improve society by
discouraging reproduction among certain people deemed less fit or worthy of
reproducing. 66 This Part argues that much of the welfare debate and the welfare
"reforms" passed in 1996 are an extension of the dark history of the eugenics
movement in the United States. Most importantly, the 1996 law, although it
never mentions "eugenics," contains provisions explicitly designed to discour-




Sterilizing or otherwise discouraging childbirth among the poor was a
prominent theme of the eugenics movement, and it became a theme of the de-
bate around welfare reform when eugenics became an unacceptable topic of
political discourse. Much of the rhetoric around welfare reform centers on the
idea of irresponsible "welfare queens" being paid by the government to have
68more children. In particular, the language and imagery surrounding welfare
reform debates often center on the concern that African-American women are
having too many children "on the dole."
69
States have long attempted to discourage welfare recipients from having
children. Sterilization of welfare mothers has been unofficially implemented
periodically by conditioning welfare benefits on sterilization or sterilizing
women on welfare with coerced consent, no consent, or sometimes without
their knowledge.70 Additionally, in the 1960s, at least seven Southern and
Midwestern states considered proposals to order the sterilization of single
71mothers. Similarly, numerous states have considered mandating that women
on welfare receive Norplant implants, and several states require that women on
welfare receive information on Norplant or offer welfare recipients incentives
to use Norplant.
72
The idea that federal welfare policy should be crafted to discourage "irre-
sponsible" childbirth finally came to fruition in 1996 when Congress abolished
the traditional income support program for the poor, Aid to Families with De-
66. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
67. See generally Huberfeld, supra note 36, at 99; ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 202-45.
68. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 111; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 162-66 (1996).
69. See generally QUADAGNO, supra note 29.
70. See ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 89-98.
71. Id at 94. See generally David S. Coale, Note, Norplant Bonuses and the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEx. L. REv. 189 (1992).
72. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 108-09; Melynda G. Broomfield, Note, Controlling the Reproduc-
tive Rights of Impoverished Women: Is This the Way to "Reform" Welfare?, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 217, 232-33 (1996).
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pendent Children (AFDC). Congress replaced AFDC with Temporary Assis-
tance to Needy Families (TANF), which explicitly seeks to discourage child-
bearing among unmarried persons and teenagers.73 TANF provides grants to
states to provide abstinence education, which is to be targeted at "those groups
which are most likely to bear children out-of-wedlock." 74 States receive mone-
tary bonuses for reducing births among certain groups. For example, the five
states that reduce out-of-wedlock births the most,75 without increasing the rate
of abortion, receive $20 million each.76 There is little oversight of how states
manage to reduce these births,77 which could provide a financial incentive for
coercive actions. Additionally, states may use TANF money to provide contra-
ception or sterilization, even though they may not use it for any other medical
78services including prenatal care or abortion. Most importantly, states are
authorized to impose "family caps" on welfare recipients under TANF.79 Fam-
ily caps are designed to discourage all welfare recipients from having children
by not adjusting benefits for family size when an additional child is conceived
while a parent is receiving income support. 80 Today approximately twenty-three
states have some form of family cap.81
2. Welfare Recipients as Unfit Mothers
The rhetoric and logic of limiting welfare recipients' reproduction closely
mirror the rhetoric and logic of the eugenics movement. Eugenicists considered
children of the poor to be destined for a life of poverty and as sources of vari-
73. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2110 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter The Wel-
fare Act].
74. Id. at 2354. These programs are to teach "that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have
harmful consequences for the child, the child's parents, and society." Id.
75. Note the parallel to the enforcement of sexual mores through eugenic policy. The bonus is in no
way tied to poverty, so states are, in effect, penalized for having too many single professional women
who choose to have children or too many lesbian co-parents without a legally recognized relationship.
See Huberfeld, supra note 36, at 101.
76. The Welfare Act § 2118.
77. Huberfeld, supra note 36, at 99.
78. The Welfare Act § 2137.
79. See, e.g., Peter Pitegoff and Lauren Breen, Child Care Policy and the Welfare Reform Act, 6 J.
AFFORDABLE Hous. & CMTY. DEV. L. 113, 116 (1997); Susan L. Thomas, "Ending Welfare As We
Know It," or Farewell to the Rights of Women on Welfare? A Constitutional And Human Rights Analy-
sis of the Personal Responsibility Act, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 179 (2001). Even though the bonus
for reducing births is conditioned on abortion rates not rising, there is some evidence that family caps
contribute to an increase in abortion among welfare recipients.
80. Huberfeld, supra note 36, at 109. Previously, states could create family caps if they received a
waiver from the federal government to do so. See Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Chil-
dren: A Harm-Based Analysis of Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights of Welfare Benefici-
aries, 14 LAw& INEQ. J. 1, 4 (1995).
81. U.S Department of Health and Human Services, Other Key Provisions of State TANF Plans,
available at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofa/KEY2.HTM (last visited Apr. 5, 2002). Note that
the Department itself uses the term "family caps," illustrating that the policies are explicitly intended to
discourage reproduction.
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ous social ills. Especially after the start of the Great Depression, eugenics was
promoted as a way of reducing the long-term costs of poverty by reducing the
number of future "state wards."82 The 1996 Welfare Act contained similar rea-
soning. For example, the law states that "[c]hildren born into families receiving
welfare assistance are three times more likely to be on welfare when they reach
adulthood than children not born into families receiving welfare." 83 The law
goes beyond focusing solely on welfare recipients having children, stating that
"[c]hildren born out-of-wedlock are more likely to experience.., child abuse
and neglect[,] ... have lower cognitive scores, lower educational aspirations,
and a greater likelihood of becoming teenage parents themselves[,] and are
three times more likely to be on welfare when they grow up. ' 84 Similarly,
"[c]hildren of teenage single parents have lower cognitive scores, lower educa-
tional aspirations, and a greater likelihood of becoming teenage parents them-
selves." 85 Much like earlier eugenic literature stressing differential birthrates
between favored and disfavored groups, the Act highlighted the increasing
birthrates among welfare recipients, unmarried people, and teenagers in con-
trast to the decreasing birthrates among married people. 86 The Act concluded,
"[i]n light of this demonstration of the crisis in our Nation, it is the sense of the
Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out-of-
wedlock birth are very important Government interests." 87 This reasoning is
nearly identical to eugenic reasoning of the past.
88
3. But It's No Longer in the Genes
Some may object that while eugenics was based on flawed theories of bio-
logical heritability, current efforts to discourage reproduction among welfare
recipients are based on theories of socio-cultural transmission of poverty, and
thus represent a different phenomenon. However, the central idea of eugenics,
at least as practiced, is that society can be improved by reducing the birthrates
of those that society believes will contribute less fit offspring. Heritability of
undesirable traits was largely assumed in the early eugenics movement, and
there was little interest in the methods of heritability, whether genetic or social.
Eugenic policies often focused on social problems, such as "sexual license,"
with, at best, tenuous biological justifications. 89 Eugenic literature often con-
founded ideas of biological and social heritability. One text stated, "A dispro-
82. REILLY, supra note 8, at 522.
83. The Welfare Act § 2112.
84. Id. § 2111.
85. Id. § 2112.
86. Id. § 2110.
87. Id. §2112.
88. See LAUGHLIN, supra note 16; SANGER, supra note 44, Adverse Differential Birthrate, supra
note 4.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 24-60.
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portionately low birth rate in socially adequate homes and a disproportionately
high birth rate in inadequate homes, is an adverse social force." 90
Similarly, while modem welfare reform rhetoric generally does not advance
arguments about genetic heritability, the use of language such as "chronic pov-
erty" and the "underclass" suggests that poverty is a permanent feature of indi-
viduals rather than a structural or economic problem. Moreover, some widely
criticized but influential researchers argue that programs that attempt to amelio-
rate poverty, such as welfare, are doomed to failure because poverty is largely
associated with racial and other inborn factors. 91 Importantly, racism, which is
founded on notions of genetic heritability, influences the popular will to cut
welfare, as many researchers have demonstrated. 92 As states lost flexibility to
deny welfare benefits to black families, the number of blacks receiving welfare
grew.93 Welfare has become strongly associated with black mothers, and whites
substantially overestimate the extent of poverty and welfare usage among black
families.94 Racial attitudes are a strong predictor of support for welfare provi-
sions.95 The idea that black people should have fewer children, combined with
beliefs that welfare is a black program and welfare encourages irresponsible
childbearing, have fueled the movement to sharply limit welfare benefits.96
Some statements regarding the need for eugenic policies are strikingly
similar to modem statements about the need to discourage births through wel-
fare reform. In 1870, John Humphrey Noyes proclaimed, "Free love, easy di-
vorce, foeticide, [and] general licentiousness ... are symptoms of the times.
Many believe that marriage is dying. Is it not remarkable that in this state of
things the loud call for scientific propagation is rising?" 97 Substitute "abortion"
for "foeticide" and "welfare reform" for "scientific propagation," and you have
the modem welfare reform debate. For example, Robert Rector of the Heritage
Foundation testified during a congressional hearing on welfare reform that
90. Adverse Differential Birthrate, supra note 4, at 195 (emphasis added). See also SANGER, supra
note 44, at 173-74, 188.
91. HERNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra note 62; Murray, supra note 62.
92. See generally QUADAGNO, supra note 29; Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna To Proletariat:
Constructing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REv. 415, 421-26
(1999); Risa E. Kaufman, Note, The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare Queen": Using State Constitu-
tions to Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 301 (1997); Doro-
thy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1994).
93. See Brito, supra note 92, at 421-26.
94. See, e.g., Martin Gilens, "Race Coding" and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 593 (1996).
95. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting
For the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 552, 591-94 (1999); Martin Gilens, Race and
Poverty in America: Public Misperceptions and the American News Media, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 515
(1996).
96. See e.g, QUADAGNO, supra note 29, at 119-21; DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF
A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN 87-91
(1973).
97. John Humphrey Noyes, Scientific Propagation, in THE MODERN THINKER 97-120 (D. Good-
man ed., 3d ed. 1870), reprinted in EUGENICS THEN AND Now 54, 77 (Carl J. Bajema ed., 1976).
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"Marriage is dying in America .... The primary goal of welfare reform must
be to save marriage: to reverse the current alarming trends and bring down the
number of out-of-wedlock births." 98 Similarly, Heidi Stirrup, Director of Gov-
ernment Relations for the Christian Coalition, testified, "The basic family unit
has been under attack from illegitimacy, promiscuity, adultery, divorce and
homosexuality,"99 and welfare reform should be used to quell the onslaught. In
summary, current efforts to reduce birth among welfare recipients are nearly
indistinguishable from eugenic efforts to reduce birth among the poor, except
for the disappearance of the word "eugenic."
B. Protecting Crack Babies by Punishing Mom
In the mid-1 980s, many states responded to the "crack epidemic" by crimi-
nally punishing mothers who give birth to infants with cocaine in their sys-
tems. 1° ° Although higher state courts overturned most convictions that were
appealed, 1° 1 in Whitner v. State, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld a
criminal child neglect conviction and its startling eight-year sentence, finding
that a fetus is a child within the meaning of the child abuse and endangerment
statute. ° 2 These punishments are justified as protecting fetuses from exposure
to crack.10 3 However, often little effort is made to detect cocaine use during
pregnancy, and convictions do not require evidence that the infant was harmed
by the drug use, 104 even though the effects of cocaine on a fetus are relatively
98. Causes of Poverty, With a Focus on Out-of-Wedlock Births: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 21 (1996) (statement of
Robert Rector, The Heritage Foundation).
99. Causes of Poverty, With a Focus on Out-of- Wedlock Births-Illegitimacy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 104th Cong. 98 (1996)
(statement of Heidi Stirrup, Director, Government Relations, The Christian Coalition).
100. Crack is cocaine that has been cooked with baking soda. Crack and cocaine are indistinguish-
able as detected in the bloodstream. Thus, women who use crack while pregnant would typically be
prosecuted for cocaine use while pregnant if the evidence comes from blood tests. I use both terms.
When I refer to the drug itself, I typically use cocaine. When discussing the political dimensions of
prosecuting women who use cocaine while pregnant, I mostly use crack to emphasize the sociological
understanding of crack as more threatening than cocaine and the targeting of women who use crack as a
subset of cocaine users. Women are occasionally prosecuted for using other drugs as well. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993) (overturning a conviction for using oxycodone
during pregnancy); State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (overturning a convic-
tion for heavy drinking during pregnancy). However, the focus of the prosecutions has been on pregnant
women who smoke crack. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 153-59.
101. See, e.g., Johnson v. State 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga.
App. 1992); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992).
102. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997). The Supreme Court recently held that testing women or their
newborn babies for drugs without the women's consent for criminal purposes violated the Fourth
Amendment; however, they declined to invalidate the program. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67 (2001).
103. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d. 469, 473 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated, 532
U.S. 67 (2001) ("The policy was intended to encourage pregnant women whose urine tested positive for
cocaine use to obtain substance abuse counseling.").
104. The Whitner Court held that the criminal child neglect statute encompasses "maternal acts
endangering or likely to endanger the life, comfort, or health of a viable fetus." 492 S.E.2d at 779.
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mild compared to those of alcohol and tobacco. 0 5 For at least some of those
instrumental in creating these policies, the penalties are a method of punishing
addicts for having children rather than protecting their children.' °6 This Part
explores the connections between eugenics and applying criminal sanctions to
women who use drugs while pregnant. I focus on South Carolina because it ac-
tively prosecutes women who use cocaine while pregnant, is the only state
where challenged convictions have been upheld, and has been the focus of
much of the scholarly debate about prosecution of addicted pregnant women.'07
1. Discouraging Reproduction
What exactly are states punishing by prosecuting women who use cocaine
while pregnant? States use criminal sanctions to deter unwanted behaviors.
When a state punishes the combination of two behaviors, it is unlikely that the
punishment will deter the behavior that usually is the antecedent condition and
is more difficult to control. To illustrate, when a state outlaws driving while
under the influence of drugs, the principal goal is to deter driving while intoxi-
cated and not particularly to deter drug use, which is independently punished
and more difficult to stop. Because crack cocaine causes severe physical addic-
tion and it is unlikely that a woman who has control over her drug use would
choose to use crack while pregnant, it is logically more apt to conceptualize
such measures as criminalizing pregnancy among addicts rather than criminal-
izing drug use among pregnant women.
Indeed, public sentiment seems to be more oriented toward discouraging
addicts from having babies than toward helping their children. For example, a
private organization offers crack addicts money to undergo permanent sterili-
zation. 10 8 Similarly, legislation that was proposed in Ohio illustrates the desire
105. See infra text accompanying notes 119-123. See also Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth, De-
velopment, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Systematic
Review, 285 JAMA 1613 (2001) (discussing the relatively mild effects of cocaine exposure in contrast
to well-established, potentially severe negative effects of alcohol and tobacco use during pregnancy).
106. I acknowledge that prosecuting women who use drugs while pregnant is different from the
policies discussed above in that it is not inherently eugenic as proseuctions could theoretically be de-
signed and applied without intention to discourage childbearing. Some people involved in the effort
may be motivated by a desire to help babies rather than discourage certain women from having chil-
dren. Thus, my contention is that these policies are eugenic as applied in at least some cases.
107. See, e.g., Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 777; Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Per-
sons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1029-51 (1999); Kimani Paul-Emile, The
Charleston Policy: Substance or Abuse?, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 325 (1999); Alma Tolliver, Case Note,
Child Abuse Statute Expanded to Protect the Viable Fetus: The Abusive Effects of South Carolina's
Interpretation of the Word "Child", 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 383 (2000); Carolyn Coffey, Note, Whitner v.
State: Aberrational Judicial Response Or Wave of the Future for Maternal Substance Abuse Cases?,
14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 211 (1997).
108. Wendy Chavkin, Cocaine and Pregnancy-Time to Look at the Evidence, 285 JAMA 1626
(2001), citing L.M. PALTROW ET AL., YEAR 2000 OVERVIEW: GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO
PREGNANT WOMEN WHO USE ALCOHOL OR OTHER DRUGS (2000) (describing public hysteria over "crack
babies").
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to discourage birth among drug addicts. The legislation would have forced
first-time drug offenders who did not successfully complete a drug treatment
program to "undergo implantation of a hormonal contraceptive device,... par-
ticipate in a five-year program of monitored contraceptive use approved by the
court, and during the five-year period abstain from the addictive use of drugs."
A repeat offender would be sentenced to have a contraceptive device implanted
in her regardless of her treatment status. 109 Providing improved treatment and
monitoring drug abstinence would protect fetuses from drug exposure, but the
legislation focused on enforcing the contraceptive use.
The idea that punishing women who use drugs while pregnant was meant to
protect their babies would be more credible if the emphasis were on treating the
women and their children rather than on punishment. However, many states,
including South Carolina, have focused on the arrest and prosecution of drug-
abusing mothers. 10 Many important medical and public health organizations
oppose punishing women who use drugs while pregnant, believing that the
measures are ineffective for improving child outcomes and detrimental to the
mothers' health."' Most pregnant addicts have few or no meaningful treatment
options as many drug treatment programs do not accept pregnant women. Even
fewer accept women on Medicaid or without health insurance, and cocaine ad-S• 112
dicts are disproportionately uninsured or Medicaid recipients. South Caro-
lina's actions illustrate the desire to punish childbirth among cocaine addicts. In
South Carolina, the state most active in punishing pregnant addicts, there are
few treatment options for pregnant women. 1 3 The state has waited until after
some women have given birth to arrest them, even though they tested positive
for cocaine use during pregnancy, when intervention possibly could have
helped the fetus. 14 In some cases, women were arrested within hours of giving
birth, taken to jail in handcuffs and shackles, still bleeding. 1
5
109. Nancy Kubasek, The Case Against Prosecutions for Prenatal Drug Abuse, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L. 167, 174 (1999); Deborah Ann Bailey, Comment, Maternal Substance Abuse: Does Ohio Have
An Answer?, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1019, 1033 (1992) (citing S. 82, 119th General Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 1991)).
110. See, e.g., Paltrow, supra note 107, at 1024-26. See also infra text accompanying notes 113-
115 (describing South Carolina's actions).
111. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 190-91 (detailing the groups that oppose the punishments).
112. Louise Marlane Chan, Note, S.O.S. From the Womb: A Call for New York Legislation Crimi-
nalizing Drug Use During Pregnancy, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 199, 208 (1993) (stating that less than
half of drug treatment programs in New York City accept pregnant women (citing Wendy Chavkin,
Speech Delivered to Columbia University School of Public Health (1992) (transcript at New York Su-
preme Court))); id. (stating only thirteen-percent accept pregnant crack addicts on Medicaid (citing
Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278, 287 (1990))).
113. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 187-88.
114. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d. 469, 484, 488 (4th Cir. 1999) (Blake, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
115. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 166.
Vol. 20:481, 2002
Eugenics and Equality
2. Demonizing Pregnant Addicts
In South Carolina, a judge sentencing a woman to jail for using cocaine
while pregnant showed his antipathy toward pregnant drug addicts, stating,
"I'm sick and tired of these girls having these bastard babies on crack co-
caine." ' 1 6 The judge's focus was not sympathy for "these bastard babies," but
rather his belief that "these girls" should not have children. One of the difficul-
ties with conceptualizing the punishment of women who use cocaine while
pregnant as eugenic is that the judge's sentiment that crack addicts are unfit
parents is so widespread. However, this belief, which itself is related to the
eugenic idea that certain people should be discouraged from having children, is
a product of racist and classist associations with crack users that have little to
do with the actual dangers of the drug. Moreover, these laws as implemented,
like the eugenic sterilization laws of the past, target poor and minority women,
who have so long been devalued as unfit mothers.
Why target mothers who abuse crack while pregnant? Crack babies" 7 make
up only a small portion of infants born with prenatal exposure to illegal
drugs.118 Furthermore, the number of babies born exposed to crack is dwarfed
by those exposed to alcohol and tobacco." 9 Although crack babies are a small
portion of babies born exposed to potentially harmful legal and illegal drugs,
the strong reaction against crack might be justifiable if it were much more dam-
aging to fetuses than other drugs. 10 However, prenatal cocaine exposure is
nowhere near as dangerous as popularly believed. A meta-analysis of thirty-six
studies of the effects of prenatal cocaine exposure, controlling for alcohol and
tobacco exposure, found no consistent negative associations between prenatal
cocaine exposure and growth, developmental test scores, language abilities, or
child behavior. Mild negative associations were found for motor skills and at-
tentiveness in infancy. 12 Cocaine use during pregnancy is certainly not healthy,
but scientific research suggests that the reports that cocaine use during preg-
nancy is "devastating," leaving "many crack babies . . . seriously handi-
capped"' 122 are highly exaggerated. In contrast, tobacco and alcohol have well-
established negative effects on cognitive functioning and behavior. Fetal alco-
116. Statement of Judge Frank Eppes during the hearing of Malissa Ann Crawley, quoted in
Mikeisha T. Anderson, Criminal Penalties for Women Engaging in Substance Abuse During Preg-
nancy, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 181, 181 (2000).
117. I use the terms "crack babies" and "crack mothers" to emphasize the way society views them
and as a convenient shorthand. I do not suggest that being born exposed to crack cocaine has any sort of
definitional significance. Note that society has invented the term "crack baby," while terms such as "al-
cohol baby" or "marijuana baby" do not exist.
118. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 156.
119. Id.
120. 1 do not contend that this would make punishing women who use crack while pregnant good
public policy, merely that it would make it logically defensible.
121. Frank, supra note 105.
122. Chan, supra note 112, at 200-01.
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hol syndrome is the most common cause of mental retardation in the United
States. 123 Yet there are no sterilization campaigns for women who drink and
very few women are charged with child abuse for using alcohol while preg-
nant. 
12 4
Prosecutors began targeting women who used crack while pregnant as part
of the hysteria surrounding the "crack epidemic" in the late 1980s. After first
being identified in the popular press in 1985,125 the crack epidemic was the
subject of over one thousand stories in six of the nation's largest newspapers in
1986.126 The hysteria over crack led to the adoption of criminal penalties for
crack possession that are one hundred times more severe than the penalties for
the same amount of cocaine, even though they are chemically the same drug.' 
27
Crack is especially feared because it is associated with impoverished, inner-city• .128
African-American communities. Society reacted so strongly to "protect"
crack babies because of the hysteria over crack and because crack mothers fit
the stereotypes of poor, black women, who have long been targeted as unfit
mothers.
The targeting of prosecutions at poor, black women suggests that these
penalties demonstrate antipathy toward certain women having children rather
than concern for their babies. Substance abuse rates during pregnancy are
roughly equal between white and African-American women. 129 Although co-
caine abuse may be somewhat more prevalent in black women, the differences
are far less extreme than the prosecutions would suggest. 130 Overall, approxi-
mately 70-80% of those arrested for drug abuse while pregnant have been mi-
norities. 13 Doctors are more likely to report pregnant women who are black or
poor, even where drug abuse does not differ. 32 Additionally, the tendency to
prosecute only mothers who use cocaine while ignoring other illegal drugs
123. Ann Pytkowicz Streissguth et al., Fetal Alcohol Syndrome in Adolescents and Adults, 265
JAMA 1961 (1991).
124. Cf Paltrow, supra note 107, at 1019-20, 1042 (discussing the application of the Whitner ra-
tionale to alcohol consumption by pregnant women and highlighting a case of a woman arrested in
South Carolina for drinking alcohol after Whitner).
125. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 155.
126. Paltrow, supra note 107, at 1017 (quoting LAURA E. G6MEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS 14
(1997)).
127. See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the crack/cocaine sen-
tencing disparity does not violate equal protection).
128. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 377 (1997) (discussing a National Institute
of Drug Abuse study from 1991 that found that blacks use crack at a higher rate, but there are more
white crack users overall).
129. A study of 698 pregnant woman in Florida found alcohol or illegal drugs in the urine of
15.4% of white women and 14.1% of black women. Ira Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit Drug
or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,
Florida, 322 New Eng. J. Med. 1204.
130. Id.
131. Anderson, supra note 116, at 183; ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 172.
132. Chasnoff, supra note 129, at 1204 (finding that doctors are more likely to report poor patients
and ten times more likely to report black patients who use drugs).
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contributes to the race bias in prosecutions. In South Carolina, a higher per-
centage of mothers who tested positive for cocaine were African-American,
compared to those who tested positive for any drug. 33 Thus, prosecuting preg-
nant women only for cocaine use will have a racially disparate impact even
without biased prosecution. Moreover, South Carolina only prosecutes women
who give birth at the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC). MUSC,
the only hospital in the Charleston area that provides obstetric care for indigent
patients and Medicaid recipients, serves predominately poor, African-American
patients.134 All of the women South Carolina has arrested were poor. Forty-one
of forty-two women arrested were black, and the father of the white woman's
baby was black.
135
The situation in South Carolina raises the specter of overbroad eugenic
policies selectively applied to unpopular groups, such as the past eugenic
abuses in Virginia when state authorities raided rural communities to find unfit
people to sterilize. 36 The Whitner court held that any "maternal acts endan-
gering or likely to endanger the life, comfort, or health of a viable fetus" could
be criminally punished as child abuse.137 A wide variety of legal and illegal ac-
tions could harm fetal health or comfort. The remarkably broad and ambiguous
definition would allow South Carolina to prosecute a wide variety of actions
that could be found likely to endanger the comfort or health of the fetus, which
the court recognizes but does not address. 13 8 In a later case challenging the con-
stitutionality of South Carolina's policy, the court rejected arguments contend-
ing that selectively implementing punitive policies in hospitals that serve pre-
dominantly poor, African-American populations is racially discriminatory.
39
The broad definition, combined with racist and classist devaluation of certain
mothers and wide prosecutorial discretion, creates a tremendous risk that this
law will be misused to punish pregnancy among members of socially unpopular
groups when they do not follow every convention of proper prenatal care.
3. But Now It's Really Not in the Genes
As with welfare recipients, few would argue that crack addicts are unfit
133. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d. 469, 481 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated, 532 U.S. 67
(2001).
134. Paul-Emile, supra note 107, at 349-50; ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 173.
135. Id. at 166. A white nurse instrumental in instituting the program admitted that she believes
interracial mixing is wrong. Paltrow, supra note 107, at 1025. Additionally, the same nurse reportedly
expressed racist views to others at the hospital, including the belief that most black women should have
their tubes tied. ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 174-75.
136. See supra text accompanying note 38.
137. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779.
138. Id. at781-82.
139. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d. 469, 480-81 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated, 532 U.S. 67
(2001). The Supreme Court vacated the decision under the Fourth Amendment, but did not consider
charges of discrimination. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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mothers because they are genetically inferior. However, the idea that women
who use crack are unfit mothers parallels the earlier uses of eugenics to justify
discrimination against minority and poor women. As discussed above, punish-
ing women who use crack during pregnancy is largely about discouraging poor,
African-American women from having children. The calls to regulate pregnant
women to stem the tide of "crack babies," lamenting that "millions of drug-
impaired, dysfunctional children will become part of America's future genera-
tion"'140 sounds much like the eugenic rhetoric of the past. A judge sentencing a
woman who used crack while pregnant used dehumanizing, racialized rhetoric
to describe the woman's normal, healthy child. "[W]e've got enough trouble
with normal children. Now this little baby's born with crack .... They just run
around in class like a little rat [sic]. Not just black ones. White ones too.'1
41
While the claims to heritability grow more tenuous as eugenics becomes less
explicit, punishing crack mothers is an extension of this country's long history
of attempting to discourage racial minorities and other disfavored groups from
reproducing.
C. Current Practices: Conclusion
There are a number of other American policies that may have been influ-
enced by eugenic concerns. While the eugenic sterilization laws of the past are
seldom invoked, many states allow the sterilization of mentally retarded people
under some circumstances without their consent, but with their parents' con-
sent. 142 Additionally, some doctors or publicly funded health practitioners may
counsel women with the sickle cell trait, which is seen only in black people and
in a substantial portion of the black population, that they should undergo ster-
ilization, although it is not medically recommended. 43 Recently, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ordered a man not to have children as a condition of probation
for not paying child support, unless he could show that he would be able to
support that child as well as his current children. 
144
Eugenic concerns seem particularly likely to be influential in programs
supporting the poor. For example, the federal government funds sterilization for
poor women through Medicaid, but does not fund abortion, giving women an
140. Chan, supra note 112, at 236.
141. See Paltrow, supra note 107 at 1025-26, quoting State v. Collins, No. 93-CP-39-859 (S.C. Ct.
Gen. Sess. Pickens County Dec. 18, 1991).
142. See, e.g., In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 542 (N.H. 1980) (finding that a probate court had
jurisdiction to authorize parents, in conjunction with a guardian ad litem, to consent to their fourteen-
year-old daughter's sterilization).
143. See Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (reversing dismissal of a
case in which plaintiff submitted to sterilization after a a clinic operated by the County Board of Health
erroneously informed her that she carried the sickle cell trait and misrepresented the need for her to be
sterilized).
144. State v. Oakley, 530 U.S. 1282 (2001).
Vol. 20:481, 2002
Eugenics and Equality
incentive to be sterilized if they cannot afford to have a baby.145 Many Ameri-
can social programs are hidden in the tax code and are regressive; American's
poorest do not benefit from them.146 Additionally, the country's largest means-
tested income transfer program, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), has a
built in "family cap," as it does not adjust for family size for more than two
children. 14 The EITC grew out of a failed guaranteed income plan, which was
fought by the powerful Senator Russell Long, the Chair of the Finance Com-
mittee, who opposed "paying people not to work" but to "lay about all day...
producing illegitimate babies."' 48 Senator Long modified the plan to be a tax
provision and promoted it as the EITC.149 The enactment and expansion of the
EITC was linked to efforts to cut welfare, 15 which, as discussed above, was
premised on the belief that welfare encourages irresponsible childbearing.
Additionally, criminal penalties may be used to inhibit reproduction among
those convicted. Most notably, several states have implemented laws mandating
or permitting "chemical castration" of certain sex offenders. 151 Chemical cas-
tration inhibits the sex drive and usually eliminates the ability to procreate dur-
ing use, but is reversible.' 52 These laws probably are motivated in part by the
desire to protect children from sexual abuse, however, the use of chemical cas-
tration evokes earlier sterilization policies,'53 especially when mandated for
extended time periods or used for minor offenses. For example, Oregon's law
can be applied to people convicted of engaging in sodomy or of "public inde-
145. LESLEY DOYAL, WHAT MAKES WOMEN SICK: GENDER AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
HEALTH 107 (1995).
146. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNTIED STATES 27-32 (1997).
147. Id. at 22-23, 46, 139. The EITC transferred $28 billion in 1996. More than eighty percent of
the cost is direct spending for the "refundable" portion of the credit rather than reduced tax liabilities.
148. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON
ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN 523 (1973).
149. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 146, at 70-72.
150. See, e.g., Id. at 143-50; John Myles & Paul Pierson, Friedman's Revenge: The Reform of
"Liberal" Welfare States in Canada and the United States, 25 POL. & SOC'Y 443 (1997).
151. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Se-
lecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 627, n. 105 (2000) (stating that Cali-
fornia, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, and Montana have laws permitting chemical castration);
Mark J. Neach, Comment, California is on the "Cutting Edge ": Hormonal Therapy (A.K.A. "Chemical
Castration ") is Mandated for Two-Time Child Molesters, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 351, 357-59 (1997)
(discussing California's chemical castration law); Caroline M. Wong, Comment, Chemical Castration:
Oregon 's Innovative Approach to Sex Offender Rehabilitation, or Unconstitutional Punishment?, 80
OR. L. REV. 267, 272-76 (2001) (describing Oregon's pilot program that subjects some sex offenders to
chemical castration as a condition of parole).
152. See Jason 0. Runckel, Comment, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at California's Mandatory
Chemical Castration Law, 28 PAC. L. J. 547, 558-59 (1997).
153. See generally Jodi Berlin, Note, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: "A Shot in the Arm"
Towards Rehabilitation, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 169, 173-77 (1997) (discussing eugenics in relation to
chemical castration); Avital Stadler, Comment, California Injects New Life into an Old Idea: Taking a
Shot at Recidivism, Chemical Castration, and the Constitution, 46 EMORY L. J. 1285, 1299-1305
(1997).
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cency" for having sex in public. 54 Finally, as noted earlier, eugenics also en-
compasses policies related to death rates. 155 The United States is one of very
few industrialized countries that still uses the death penalty, 156 which is im-
posed disproportionately on minorities. 157 I do not attempt to demonstrate that
any of the policies mentioned in this brief Part were actually influenced by
eugenic concerns. This Part is intended merely to suggest that the policies dis-
cussed above are not anomalies, but rather part of a larger strand of American
social policy that has been influenced by eugenic ideas.
III. EUGENICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
Upon declaring independence from England, the Founders proclaimed that
"all men are created equal, [and] they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Hap-. ,,158
piness. They promptly and wholeheartedly ignored their own words. The
equality principle was finally enshrined in American law in 1868, with the rati-
fication of the Fourteenth Amendment, which promised all United States citi-
zens equal protection of the law. 59 Unfortunately, this promise of equality was
largely ignored for most of a century.
In 1927, the Supreme Court upheld Virginia's eugenic sterilization law
against an equal protection challenge. In doing so, the Court elevated eugenic
prejudices to constitutional status, proclaiming, "It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit
from continuing their kind.. ... Three generations of imbeciles are enough.'
160
The Buck Court reasoned that the principles that justified the draft and compul-
sory vaccinations were "broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes."
'1 61
Although Buck v. Bell may seem shocking to many modern Americans, it has
never been overturned, and it is arguably still good law. In fact, it was cited fa-
162vorably as recently as 2001. The failure of our jurisprudence to squarely re-
154. See Wong, supra note 151, at 272-73, 287-88.
155. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
156. For a list of nations retaining the death penalty, see DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
THE DEATH PENALTY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2001), availible at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicintl.htnl. The United States executes more people than any other
country except China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Id.
157. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); KENNEDY, supra note 128, at 311-50;
William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of
Jurors'Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171 (2001).
158. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
160. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
161. Id.
162. Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001) (holding that the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act invalidly abrogated states' immunity from suit under the 11 th Amendment as Congress had
not identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states against the disabled).
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ject eugenics reinforces the perpetuation of policies with eugenic underpin-
nings and reflects this country's ongoing failure of to come to terms with ra-
cism, sexism, and classism. Constitutional doctrine pertaining to eugenic poli-
cies is discussed below. Although constitutional doctrine related to equal
protection is most relevant to consideration of eugenics and the equality ideal,
the doctrine of reproductive privacy is examined briefly, as it is the constitu-
tional doctrine most clearly addressing the right to reproduce.
A. Reproductive Privacy
Skinner v. Oklahoma considerably undermined Buck v. Bell.163 Skinner, for
the first time, recognized reproduction as a "basic civil right." 164 However, the
Court's decision was justified in part on equality concerns: "[S]trict scrutiny of
the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest
unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal
laws."' 65 Yet, the Court expressly distinguished rather than overruled Buck.'
66
The opinion assumed that eugenic policies, carefully crafted, were valid state
endeavors.167 As discussed above, eugenic sterilization laws remained in force
in a number of states after Skinner. 1
68
Later decisions affirmed and extended the right to reproductive privacy.
They generally did so in the context of freedom from state interference with the
right not to reproduce, analyzing the right in terms of substantive due process
rather than a fundamental freedom under equal protection.' 69 The Court has
consistently maintained that reproductive privacy is limited, and cited Buck for•• 170
that proposition in the original abortion rights decisions. More recent abor-
tion decisions, especially Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, have undermined the right to reproductive privacy, allowing state laws
intended to discourage abortion, as long as they do not create an undue burden
on the right to have an abortion.' 7' However, the limitations on reproductive
freedom were justified by the states' interest in protecting fetuses. The Casey
163. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
164. Id. at 541.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 542.
167. Id. 539-42 (finding that states may create eugenic laws, but that Oklahoma's classification did
not fit closely enough with the inheritability of criminal traits to be valid).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21, 59-60.
169. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the limited right to
have an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a right to have abor-
tions); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that unmarried people have a right to use
contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that married couples have a
right to use contraception).
170. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973).
171. Casey, 505 U.S. at 88.
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Court expressly reaffirmed numerous non-abortion reproductive privacy deci-
sions, stating "the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with
a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood.'
17 2
Because the undue burden framework was devised as a compromise in the
abortion context, the Court would probably continue to closely scrutinize laws
that clearly interfere with reproductive privacy without protecting fetuses.
Thus, some of the more coercive eugenics laws, for example sterilization laws,
would probably be struck down under the right to reproductive privacy. How-
ever, reproductive privacy is less likely to reach policies that do not place a
large burden on reproduction. For example, the Court, upholding a welfare
provision that adjusted grants for family size up to a maximum grant amount, a
form of family cap, under equal protection rational basis review did not even
consider the reproductive privacy claim. 173 Even the dissent dismissed the re-
productive privacy claim, stating, "the effect of the maximum grant regulation
upon the right of procreation is marginal and indirect at best, totally unlike the
compulsory sterilization law that was at issue in Skinner."'174 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit rejected reproductive privacy challenges to the New
Jersey family cap, which is based explicitly on the idea that "to have a child
while receiving public support" is "irresponsible [and] not socially desir-
able."' 175 The court stated, "[I]t would be remarkable to hold that a state's fail-
ure to subsidize a reproductive choice burdens that choice."' 76 Similarly, under
the undue burden framework, it is probable that punishing illegal drug use
during pregnancy would be found not to cause an undue burden on reproduc-
tive privacy. Logically, such penalties could extend to include legal activities,
as long the penalties did not create an undue burden on reproductive decisions.
The privacy doctrine does not inquire about intent, and the courts have held
that a state is not obligated to remove obstacles to the exercise of reproductive
freedom that it did not create, 177 presumably even if it were acting with explic-
itly eugenic intentions.
In summary, privacy probably protects against some, but not all, forms of
eugenic policies. In part, that may be because of inadequacies in the privacy
doctrine. But, in part, it is because the concepts of privacy and reproductive
autonomy do not reach the central harm of eugenic policy.' 78 The central harm
172. Id. at 849.
173. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
174. Id. at 521 n.14.
175. C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 1996).
176. C.K., 92 F.3dat 195.
177. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding federal denial of Medicaid funding for
abortions except where the life of the mother is endangered by carrying the fetus to term); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding state's denial of Medicaid funding for abortion except where
medically necessary).
178. Many feminist scholars have argued similarly that redefining abortion as a sex equality right
would better address the central harm of abortion restrictions. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from
Vol. 20:481, 2002
Eugenics and Equality
in eugenics is the judgment that the lives of certain groups are less valuable
than the lives of others and the world would be better off in the future if those
groups did not reproduce. Interference with reproductive decision-making,
which creates an additional harm, is a method of translating the devaluation of
certain people's lives into public policy. To illustrate, imagine that the govern-
ment instituted a eugenic program that paid people who were deemed espe-
cially "fit" to have children. It would be difficult to contend that this action
"interfered" with reproduction in any material way, but there would still be a
real harm in making relative valuations of people's lives. Or imagine that the
government decided to place soldiers who were least "fit" to reproduce in the
most dangerous positions in a war, so that casualties would not harm the coun-
try's future reproductive capacity. The link to reproductive privacy in such a
situation would be tenuous, but the link to eugenics is clear and the valuing of
lives is offensive to any notion of equality.
B. Equal Protection
If the central harm of a eugenic program is a gross violation of the equality
ideal, then perhaps constitutional protection from eugenic policies could be
found in the Equal Protection Clause. Unfortunately, the Equal Protection
Clause offers minimal protection, as current jurisprudence contemplates equal
protection as the guarantee of non-differentiation between certain protected
groups. Eugenic policies based explicitly on race or sex would almost certainly
be invalidated, while other policies would likely be upheld if the Court finds
that they could rationally be believed to promote some legitimate goal.
1. Strict scrutiny.
For a period after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal pro-
tection arguments were rarely successful. The Buck Court characterized equal
protection as the "last resort of constitutional arguments. 1 79 Soon after the
Fourteenth Amendment was passed, the Court established that the amendment
would be read as primarily protecting African Americans from discrimination,
despite its race-neutral wording.180 However, the Court soon recognized that
the Equal Protection Clause protected others from invidious discrimination.'
81
the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REv. 261 (1992).
179. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
180. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872) ("We doubt very much whether any action of a
State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race,
will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.").
181. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412 (1920) (invalidating an income tax that taxed Virginia corporations for income made out-
side the state); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (granting relief to a Chinese plaintiff under
the Equal Protection Clause).
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The Court devised a two-tiered system of review, whereby most classifications
are subjected to minimal scrutiny, but classifications based on race or another
suspect classification and classifications burdening a fundamental interest are
subjected to strict scrutiny. An intermediate tier, discussed below, was later
added for sex discrimination.' 82 In order to survive strict scrutiny, a racial clas-
sification must be necessary to serve a compelling government interest and
must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, a test that few classifications
survive.183
Despite the numerous interconnections between racism and eugenics and
the heavily disparate impact various forms of eugenic policies have on racial
minorities, unless a eugenic policy explicitly classified by race, it would be un-
likely to be analyzed under strict scrutiny as racial discrimination. If a policy
maker were unwise enough to create a eugenic policy that explicitly classified
by race, it would be subject to strict scrutiny and almost certainly would be in-
validated. Government action that does not explicitly classify by race may be
subject to strict scrutiny if it can be shown that the government intended to dis-
criminate by race. 184 However, even with a foreseeable, heavily racially-
disparate impact, a policy does not receive strict scrutiny unless the plaintiff
can show that the government created the classification in part because of the
disparate impact, not merely in spite of it.'85 Discriminatory intent is difficult to
prove. 186 For example, the Ferguson court rejected arguments that South Caro-
lina's prosecution program is racially discriminatory although it was only im-
plemented in a hospital primarily serving African Americans and nearly all
those prosecuted were African American. is7 Classifications based on national
origin or alienage are also subject to strict scrutiny,' 88 but for similar reasons as
above, eugenic classifications would be unlikely to draw strict scrutiny on these
grounds unless they made explicit classifications by national origin or alienage.
Finally, although reproduction was considered a fundamental right under equal
protection in Skinner, subsequent reproductive privacy cases have been ana-
182. See infra text accompanying notes 190-198.
183. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
184. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-
42 (1960); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
185. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987); Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
186. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279 (upholding the racially disparate imposition of the
death penalty against a study that statistically controlled for a variety of factors and still found large
racial disparities); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); United States
v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no intent to discriminate in prosecution for crack
possession where 98.2% of those convicted were black).
187. 186 F.3d. 469, 479-82 (4th Cir. 1999), vacated, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). The Supreme Court va-
cated the decision under the Fourth Amendment, but did not consider the discrimination claim, 532
U.S. 67 (2001). See also ROBERTS, supra note 20, at 172-75 (discussing evidence of racial bias in
South Carolina's program); Paltrow, supra note 107, at 1023-26 (same).
188. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
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lyzed as a substantive due process right rather than an equal protection right.
Constitutional protection of reproductive privacy is discussed above.
1 89
In summary, eugenic policies would only be subject to strict scrutiny if they
were explicitly based on race, national origin, or alienage, or intent to discrimi-
nate by these classifications could be shown. Thus, many explicitly eugenic
policies could be drafted to avoid strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny.
Government actions that differentiate by sex are subject to intermediate
scrutiny, and must be substantially related to an important governmental inter-
est to survive a challenge.1 90 As with race, sex discrimination must either be
explicit or intention to discriminate by sex must be shown.! 9 1 If a eugenic pol-
icy only applied to men or women as a group, it would be subjected to interme-
diate scrutiny and probably invalidated. 92 However, this would not include
policies that only apply to pregnant women, as the Supreme Court has held
that, for equal protection purposes, discrimination based on pregnancy is not
sex discrimination because "non-pregnant persons" include both men and193
women. Many scholars have attacked this reasoning, as many sex- and raced-
based classifications recognized by the Court affect only a subset of the disfa-
vored group, and regulation of pregnancy has historically been used to rein-
force women's subordinate status.' 94 Nevertheless, policies aimed at pregnant
women probably would not be subjected to intermediate scrutiny under equal
protection. Similarly, although parents receiving welfare are overwhelmingly
female, eugenic policies governing welfare recipients could be worded in gen-
der-neutral terms so as to avoid intermediate scrutiny.'
95
Additionally, classifications based on "illegitimacy" are subject to interme-
diate scrutiny. 96 Although the Court recognizes discouraging out-of-wedlock
births as an important state interest, the Court does not recognize punishing il-
189. See supra text accompanying notes 164-178.
190. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
191. Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276 (1979).
192. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (stating that there must be an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for sex-based government action (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)(citations omitted)).
193. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
194. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 178, at 268-72; see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983 (1984) ("Criticizing Geduldig has since become a cottage
industry. Over two dozen law review articles have condemned both the Court's approach and the re-
sult.").
195. However, a state law regarding Norplant or other hormonal contraception might be subject to
intermediate review because hormonal contraceptives for men do not exist.
196. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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legitimate children as a legitimate way to promote that interest.' 97 Eugenic poli-
cies specifically targeting children born out of wedlock might be invalidated
under intermediate scrutiny if they deprived illegitimate children of a substan-
tial benefit. For example, the Court invalidated a state welfare program limited
to married couples as unlawful discrimination based on illegitimacy.1 98 In
summary, only if a eugenic policy specifically categorized by sex or illegiti-
macy, or intention to discriminate by sex or illegitimacy could be shown, would
that policy receive intermediate equal protection scrutiny. Therefore, eugenic
policies could be crafted to avoid intermediate scrutiny.
3. Rational Basis Review
Eugenic policies crafted to avoid strict or intermediate scrutiny would re-
ceive equal protection rational basis review. The Court has explicitly decided
that classifications encompassing many of the groups that have often been tar-
geted by eugenic policies are subject to rational basis review, including the
19920020 1poor,"' drug addicts, ° the mentally retarded, and disabled people gener-
ally.2° 2 States have wide discretion under rational basis review. A classification
that has a rational relationship to any legitimate state interest will be sustained.
The classification does not actually have to promote the permissible goal, as
long as "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. '  Be-
cause the Court is generally unwilling to find that there is no way the legisla-
ture "could rationally have decided" that the classification might foster the




However, governments may not act out of a "bare desire.., to harm," ab-
205sent any rational purpose. In practice, the Court occasionally seems to hold
laws aimed at socially unpopular groups to a higher standard, sometimes re-
ferred to as "rational basis with bite., 20 6 If rational basis review were applied
without "bite," one can easily imagine the Court concluding that eugenic poli-
197. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 175 (1972).
198. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
199. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
200. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979).
201. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
202. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. Alabama v.Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963 (2001).
203. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,426 (1961).
204. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (emphasis in orig-
nial).
205. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (quoting US. Dept. ofAgric v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 534 (1973)).
206. See Gerald Gunther, A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20-48
(1972) (discussing "rational basis with bite" review). See also Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (invalidating a
Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting city ordinances protecting homosexuals from discrimi-
nation); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (overturning a city zoning ordinance aimed at the mentally re-
tarded); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533 (invalidating a regulation not permitting any household with unrelated
members to receive food stamps, which was said to be aimed at "hippies").
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cies such as sterilizing or discouraging the poor or the unmarried from having
children could reasonably be believed to lead to lower rates of poverty, or that
discouraging drug addicts from having children reasonably could be believed to
reduce infant health problems. However, the more coercive or mean-spirited a
policy is, especially if the policy-makers were to admit that they had eugenic
intentions, the more likely it seems that the policy would offend enough of the
Justices' sense of fairness that the Court would invalidate the policy.
C. Equal Protection and the Anti-Subordination Principle
Eugenics violates the very heart of the ideal of equality, by placing into
public policy the judgment that certain groups are so inferior that society may
justifiably attempt to restrict their fundamental freedom to reproduce. Yet, even
an explicitly eugenic law is not clearly unconstitutional under current Supreme
Court equal protection jurisprudence. Although many incarnations of eugenic
policies might be invalidated as violations of privacy, equal protection, or on
other grounds, 20 7 the ambiguity in the constitutional status of eugenic policy,
which seems so clearly to violate equality norms, suggests a shortcoming in
current equal protection jurisprudence.
The problem arises because the Court has translated equal protection into a
norm of non-differentiation rather than non-subordination. Having identified
certain types of group categorization frequently involved in invidious discrimi-
nation, primarily categorization by race and sex, the Court attempted to ensure
non-discrimination by barring most forms of differentiation along those lines.
This strategy is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive
because it fails to address policies that disproportionately harm protected
groups, such as racial minorities, without explicitly naming those groups. Ad-
ditionally, it is under-inclusive because it fails to account for policies harming
unprotected disadvantaged groups, such as the poor. It is over-inclusive be-
cause it disallows most government efforts to mitigate the effects of past and
current discrimination by taking the status of a subordinated group into ac-
count, constitutionally equating affirmative action with Jim Crow segregation
of the past.208
207. I suspect that many eugenic laws would be invalidated on grounds of privacy, equal protec-
tion, or other reasons. For example, a policy might violate procedural due process if officials were given
too much discretion in determining to whom the policy applied, or if the policy did not have adequate
protection to ensure that decisions were accurate. Similarly, a policy applied to criminals might violate
the Eigth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. South Carolina may no longer test
pregnant women for cocaine without their consent, as the practice was found to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
208. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (finding that federal affirmative ac-
tion programs must be held to strict scrutiny); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989) (invalidating a city affirmative action program); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (invalidating the University's affirmative action program, but allowing it to create
a more limited program).
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The current framework is incapable of eliminating the disadvantage of ra-
cial minorities and other explicitly protected groups, as long as either explicit
categorization or intent to discriminate must be shown. Dominant groups may
reinforce disadvantaged groups' subordination through policies targeting un-
protected categories. For example, because poverty and race are correlated, the
racial caste system can be reinforced by policies that disadvantage the poor.
Even a completely race-neutral eugenic policy would tend to have a racially
subordinating impact, as this country's legacy of racism has left minorities dis-
proportionately concentrated in a number of socially disadvantaged groups. Be-
cause eugenic policies reflect dominant groups' valuations of others' lives, they
will always reinforce the existing social hierarchy.
Jurisprudence focusing more generally on the impact of subordinating poli-
cies and on subordination along a variety of lines could more effectively undo
the racial hierarchy, and would also better account for discrimination against a
number of groups that now receive little protection from antidiscrimination law,
such as homosexuals, the mentally ill, drug addicts, and impoverished whites.
By focusing on racial and other categories, the Court loses sight of the central
harm of subordination. Several scholars have argued that refocusing equal pro-
tection review on a norm of anti-subordination rather than anti-differentiation
would produce better results.209 The Court's anti-differentiation jurisprudence
contends that it is inappropriate to treat individuals differently because of their
race or sex, thereby rejecting distinctions without regard to which groups are
benefited and burdened. In contrast, the central concern of the anti-
subordination framework is addressing inappropriate group subordination.
Within the latter framework, facially neutral policies that perpetuate the histori-
cal subordination of groups are illicit, while facially differentiating policies that
ameliorate subordination are not. Thus, the anti-subordination framework al-
lows public policy to undo existing social hierarchies. Additionally, by ac-
counting for policies that perpetuate historical subordination, the anti-
subordination framework accounts for prejudices people are not fully aware
that they have. 21 For example, many people who believe that welfare recipients
should not have children are probably unaware of racist and classist underpin-
nings of their belief systems. Creating an anti-subordination jurisprudence
would not only work to undo historical subordination, but might help create so-
cial awareness of ongoing subordination.
209. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Trans-
formation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Siegel, supra
note 2, at 1130-48.
210. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1136-38. See generally Charles R. Lawrence 1I, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 1987 (discussing




Most scholars who would reinterpret equal protection as an anti-
subordination doctrine treat this as a matter of asking a different question about
the treatment of protected classes: "Does this policy subordinate racial minori-
ties?" rather than "Does this policy differentiate by race?" 211 Examining
eugenics, which has been used to subordinate many disfavored groups, exposes
a danger in that framework. While racism is central to the maintenance of the
social hierarchy in the United States, it is not the only axis of subordination.
The central harm of eugenics is not racism; eugenic discrimination by race is a
manifestation of placing lower values on the lives racial minorities. A true shift
to an anti-subordination paradigm must not get caught in the same trap as that
which ensnarled the Supreme Court, focusing on categories. An anti-
subordination norm must encompass subordination of all socially disfavored
groups in order to work toward undoing the central harms of racism and other
forms of discrimination against disfavored groups--devaluation of members of
those groups.
Implementing an anti-subordination understanding of equal protection
would be relatively straightforward. It would become question of fact whether a
group is socially disadvantaged and whether a policy clearly subordinates or
disadvantages that group. Of course, intent to discriminate would remain rele-
vant to showing subordination, but showing intent to discriminate would no
longer be required. The system would be more complex than the current sys-
tem, which understands virtually all distinctions based on race as illicit, most
distinctions based on sex as illicit, and almost all distinctions made between
unprotected groups as licit. However, the complexity is unlikely to be greater
than many other areas of the law, which generally require individualized
showings of harm. An anti-subordination framework would function for all dis-
advantaed groups similarly to the current version of intermediate scrutiny for
sex discrimination, as framed in United States v. Virginia, which explicitly
adopts an asymmetrical, anti-subordination-based analysis.21 2 The principal
danger of a shift away from categorical scrutiny is that not having explicitly
heightened scrutiny would leave racial minorities and other currently protected
groups less well protected than they are now. However, given the blatant, per-
sistent, and well-documented historical subordination of protected groups such
as racial minorities and women, showing disadvantaged status should be
straightforward where policies harm currently protected groups.
211. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 209, at 1004; Owen M. Fiss, What is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 413 (1994). Some scholars would expand the number of protected classes but keep the framework
of protected classes. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument For Heightened
Scrutiny For Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753 (1996).
212. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996). See also Denise C. Morgan, Anti-
Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Sin-
gle-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381 (1999).
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D. Conclusion
The United States has never come to terms with its dark history of eugenics
or with the racism and class oppression from which the eugenics movement
sprang. Although explicitly eugenic policies largely faded away in the after-
math of the Holocaust, our failure to grapple with eugenics and the prejudices
underpinning it invited variants of eugenics to resurface with time. Most
Americans would probably say that eugenic policies are morally unacceptable,
but variants of eugenic policy are still a prevalent part of the American social
policy landscape.
We live in a nation where certain groups, particularly inner-city black
youth, still face tremendous barriers to advancement. While we have made pro-
gress against certain forms of discrimination, we cannot pretend that the prob-
lems have been solved. Perhaps because Americans often turn a blind eye to-
ward class subordination, our courts have failed to develop constitutional
jurisprudence capable of undoing subordination. Because of this, instead of
protecting against still widespread racial inequality, most successful claims of
racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause function to protect
213white people from affirmative action. The failure of our jurisprudence to
firmly reject eugenics reflects this country's ongoing failure of to come to terms
with its history of oppression. Both of these failures reinforce the perpetuation
of eugenic thought in American social policy and political discourse.
213. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1142 (outlining the most common beneficiaries of heightened
scrutiny).
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